This paper analyses capital structure of listed companies in Visegrad countries during the period from 2000 to 2001. The results are based on the database, which assembles financial reports of listed firms. In general, leverage of these firms is relatively low if measured in book value, but it is relatively high if assessed in market value. Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation is used in order to investigate the determinants of capital structure. According to the results, leverage of a company is positively correlated with size and it is negatively correlated with profitability, tangibility and non-debt tax shields. There is a negative relationship between leverage measured in market value and growth opportunities. Moreover, leverage decreases with volatility, albeit on a lower level of statistical significance.
The modern theory of capital structure was established by Modigliani and Miller (1958) . Thirty seven years later, Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1421 ) asked the basic question:
"What do we really know about corporate capital structure choice?" As they continued (Rajan and Zingales, 1995, p. 1421) : "Theory has clearly made some progress on the subject. We now understand the most important departures from the Modigliani and Miller assumptions that make capital structure relevant to a firm's value. However, very little is known about the empirical relevance of the different theories." Similarly Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 299) in their survey of capital structure theories claimed: "The models surveyed have identified a large number of potential determinants of capital structure. The empirical work so far has not, however, sorted out which of these are important in various contexts."
Thus, several conditional theories of capital structure exist (none is the universal), but very little is known about their empirical relevance. Moreover, the existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data from developed countries (G7 countries). Findings based on data from developing countries have not appeared until recently (for example Booth et al., 2001 1 and Huang and Song, 2002 2 ). So far, no study has been published based on data from transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, at least to the extent of author's knowledge. Bauer and Bubák (2003) and Bauer (2003) try to fill this gap, exploring the case of the Czech Republic.
This study refines the findings of Bauer (2003) . It focuses on four Visegrad countries, using different estimation method and more extensive data set than Bauer (2003) does.
Therefore more precise and more general results should be yielded. Also the differences in capital structure across Visegrad countries are analysed in this study.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section I the most prominent theoretical and empirical findings are surveyed. In Section II the potential determinants of capital structure are summarized and theoretical and empirical evidence concerning these determinants is provided. Section III is the empirical part of the paper. Here the data is described, measures of leverage are defined, the extent of leverage is characterized and the impact of potential determinants of capital structure on leverage is tested. Section IV provides conclusions of the study.
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I. Theoretical and empirical findings
According to Myers (2001, p. 81) : "There is no universal theory of the debt-equity choice, and no reason to expect one." However, there are several useful conditional theories 3 -each of those helps to understand the debt-to-equity structure, which firms choose. These theories can be divided into two groups -either they predict the existence of the optimal debtequity ratio for each firm (so called static trade-off models) or they declare that there is no well-defined target capital structure (pecking-order hypothesis).
Static trade-off models understand the optimal capital structure as an optimal solution of a trade-off. For example the trade-off between tax shield and costs of financial distress in the case of trade-off theory. According to this theory the optimal capital structure is achieved when the marginal present value of tax shield on additional debt is equal to the marginal present value of costs of financial distress on additional debt. The trade-off between benefits of signaling and costs of financial distress in the case of signaling theory implies that a company chooses debt ratio as a signal about its type. Therefore in the case of a good company the debt must be large enough to act as an incentive compatible signal, i.e., it does not pay off for a bad company to mimic it. In the case of agency theory the trade-off between agency costs 4 stipulates that the optimal capital structure is achieved when agency costs are minimized. Finally, the trade-off between costs of financial distress and increase of efficiency in the case of free cash-flow theory, which is designed mainly for firms with extra-high free cash-flows suggests that the high debt ratio disciplines managers to pay out cash instead of investing it below the cost of capital or wasting it in organisational inefficiencies.
On the other hand, the pecking-order theory suggests that there is no optimal capital structure. Firms are supposed to prefer internal financing (retained earnings) to external funds.
When internal cash flow is not sufficient to finance capital expenditures, firms will borrow, rather than issue equity. Therefore there is no well-defined optimal leverage, because there are two kinds of equity, internal and external, one at the top of the pecking order and one at the bottom 5 .
Existing empirical evidence is based mainly on data from developed countries. For example Bradley et al. (1984) , Kim and Sorensen (1986) , Friend and Lang (1988), Titman 3 The most prominent theories are the trade-off theory, the signaling theory (first mentioned by Ross, 1977) , the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Myers, 1977) , the free cash-flow theory (Jensen, 1986) , and the pecking-order theory Majluf, 1984 and Myers, 1984) . For more details about conditional capital structure theories see Bauer and Bubák (2003) . 4 Agency costs arise from two agency relations -relation between owners and debt holders and relation between owners and managers (non-owners), i.e., principal-agent relation.
and Wessels (1988) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) focuse on United States companies; Kester (1986) compares United States and Japanese manufacturing corporations; Rajan and Zingales (1995) examine firms from G7 countries; and Wald (1999) uses data for G7 countries except Canada and Italy. Findings based on data from developing countries appeared only in the recent years, for example Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2002) 6 .
Concerning Visegrad countries, no study has been published focusing on empirical testing of capital structure theories, at least to the extent of author's knowledge, except of Bauer and Bubák (2003) . They test for existence of optimal capital structure and for relevance of signaling theory in the case of Czech listed firms. Their results support existence of optimal capital structure and they are in accordance with the signaling theory. As far as determinants of capital structure of listed companies in Visegrad countries are concerned, Bauer (2003) explores the case of the Czech Republic. According to his results, leverage of a firm is positively correlated with size and it is negatively correlated with profitability and non-debt tax shields. There is a negative relationship between leverage measured in market value and growth opportunities. Moreover, leverage is positively correlated with volatility and tax and negatively correlated with tangibility, albeit on a lower level of statistical significance.
II. Determinants of Capital Structure
As Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 334) state: "Several studies shed light on the specific characteristics of firms and industries that determine leverage ratios […] These studies generally agree that leverage increases with fixed assets, nondebt tax shields, growth opportunities, and firm size and decreases with volatility, advertising expenditures, research and development expenditures, bankruptcy probability, profitability and uniqueness of the product." However, the results of both theoretical and empirical studies are not always unambiguous.
Based on the data availability, following determinants of capital structure are analysed in this paper: size, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields and volatility.
II. 1. Size
From the theoretical point of view, the effect of size on leverage is ambiguous. As Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1451) claim: "Larger firms tend to be more diversified and fail less often, so size (computed as the logarithm of net sales) may be an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. If so, size should have a positive impact on the supply debt.
However, size may also be a proxy for the information outside investors have, which should increase their preference for equity relative to debt."
Also empirical studies do not provide us with clear information. Some authors find positive relationship between size and leverage, for example Huang and Song (2002), Rajan and Zingales (1995) 7 and Friend and Lang (1988) . On the other hand, in some studies the negative relationship is reported, for example Kester (1986) , Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Titman and Wessels (1988) . Moreover, the results are very often weak as far as the level of statistical significance is concerned.
To proxy for the size of a company, the natural logarithm of sales is used in this study (as it is in the most studies of similar character). Another possibility is to proxy for the size of a company by the natural logarithm of total assets, however, it would not change the qualitative results of the empirical analysis 8 .
II. 2. Profitability
There are no consistent theoretical predictions on the effect of profitability on leverage. From the point of view of the trade-off theory, more profitable companies should have higher leverage, because they have more income to shield from taxes. The free-cash flow theory would suggest that the more profitable companies should use more debt in order to discipline managers, to induce them to pay out cash instead of spending money in inefficient projects. However, from the point of view of the pecking-order theory, firms prefer internal financing to external one. So the more profitable companies have lower need of the external financing, therefore they should have lower leverage.
Most empirical studies observe the negative relationship between leverage and profitability. For example Rajan and Zingales (1995) 9 , Huang and Song (2002) , Booth et al. (2001) , Titman and Wessels (1988) , Friend and Lang (1988) and Kester (1986) .
7 For all G7 countries, except of Germany. 8 It was verified by using ln (TA) instead of ln (Sales) as a proxy for SIZE, see Table 6 in Chapter III. 9 For all G7 countries, except of Germany.
In this study, profitability is proxied by return on assets (defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets).
II. 3. Tangibility
It is assumed, from the theoretical point of view, that tangible assets can be used as a collateral. Therefore higher tangibility lowers the risk of a creditor and increases the value of the assets in the case of bankruptcy. As Booth et al. (2001, p. 101) state: "The more tangible the firm's assets, the greater its ability to issue secured debt." Thus positive relationship between tangibility and leverage is predicted.
Several empirical studies confirm this suggestion, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Friend and Lang (1988) and Titman and Wessels (1988) find. On the other hand, for example Booth et al. (2001) and Huang and Song (2002) experience negative relationship between tangibility and leverage.
In this study, tangibility is defined as tangible assets divided by total assets.
II. 4. Growth Opportunities
According to Myers (1977) , firms with high future growth opportunities should use more equity financing, because a higher levered company is more likely to pass up profitable investment opportunities. As Huang and Song (2002, p. 9) claim: "such an investment effectively transfers wealth from stockholders to debtholders." Therefore negative relation between growth opportunities and leverage is predicted. As market-to-book ratio is used in order to proxy for growth opportunities, there is one more reason to expect negative relationas Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1455 ) point out: "The theory predicts that firms with high market-to-book ratios have higher costs of financial distress, which is why we expect a negative correlation."
Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, as Rajan and Zingales (1995) , Kim and Sorensen (1986) or Titman and Wessels (1988) report. However, for example, Kester (1986) and Huang and Song (2002) demonstrate positive relation between growth opportunities and leverage.
In this study, the P/B ratio (market-to-book ratio) is used as a proxy for growth opportunities.
II. 5. Non-debt tax shields
Other items apart from interest expenses, that contribute to tax payments decrease are labeled as non-debt tax shields (for example the tax deduction for depreciation). According to DeAngelo and Masulis (1980, p. 21) : "Ceteris paribus, decreases in allowable investment related tax shields (e.g., depreciation deductions or investment tax credits) due to changes in the corporate tax code or due to changes in inflation which reduce the real value of tax shields will increase the amount of debt that firms employ. In cross-sectional analysis, firms with lower investment related tax shields (holding before-tax earnings constant) will employ greater debt in their capital structures." So they argue, that non-debt tax shields are substitutes for debt related tax shield and therefore the relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage should be negative.
Some empirical studies confirm the theoretical prediction, for example Kim and Sorensen (1986, p. 140) declare: "DEPR 10 has a significantly negative coefficient.
[…] This is consistent with the notion that depreciation is an effective tax shield, and thus offsets the tax shield benefits of leverage." Negative relation between non-debt tax shields and leverage find also Huang and Song (2002) and Titman and Wessels (1988) . However, some studies observe positive relation, as Bradley et al. (1984) and Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) .
Depreciation divided by total assets is used in order to proxy for non-debt tax shields in this study.
II. 6. Volatility
Volatility may be understood as a proxy for the risk of a firm (probability of bankruptcy). Therefore it is assumed that volatility is negatively related to leverage. However, as Huang and Song (2002, p. 9 ) state based on findings of Hsia (1981) : "as the variance of the value of the firm's assets increases, the systematic risk of equity decreases. So the business risk is expected to be positively related to leverage."
The positive relation between volatility and leverage is confirmed by Kim and Sorensen (1986) and Huang and Song (2002) . Conversely, negative relation is found for example by Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988) .
In this study, standard deviation of return on assets is used as a proxy for volatility. Table 1 provides a brief summary of theoretical and empirical findings. Rajan and Zingales (1995) ; Developed countries - Harris and Raviv (1991) , i.e., survey of following empirical studies : Bradley, et al. (1984) , Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) , Friend and Hasbrouck (1988) , Friend and Lang (1988) , Gonedes, et al. (1988) , Long and Malitz (1985) , Kester (1986) , Kim and Sorensen (1986) , Marsh (1982) , and Titman and Wessels (1988) ; Developing countries -Booth et al. (2001); China -Huang and Song (2002) * According to Harris and Raviv (1991, p. 336) : "Indicates that the result was either not statistically significantly different from zero at conventional significance levels or that the result was weak in a nonstatistical sense." ° Except of Germany
III. Empirical Analysis
III. 1. Data Description
Data used in the analysis were collected from financial reports of listed companies. In Only companies, which were listed on the respective stock exchange during the observed period from 2000 to 2001 were included in the sample. Companies, which exhibited negative equity in any year of the analysis, were consequently dropped from the sample (17 companies in the case of Poland, 1 company in the case of the Czech Republic). The sample size is describe in Table 2 . In the All column of Table 2 , the total number of listed companies traded on the respective stock exchange is expressed. It comprises also financial companies, which are not subjects of our interest here. This is the main reason why the number of companies in the sample is significantly smaller than the total number of listed companies. Moreover, some companies were delisted and some newly listed during the analysed period, which also increases the difference between the total number of listed companies and sample size. It is possible to state, that for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the sample comprises almost all listed non-financial companies which fulfilled the above mentioned conditions to be included in the sample, for the Slovak Republic the sample size is relatively small. Unfortunately, it was not feasible to obtain data for more companies. However, the sample includes all companies traded on the Market of Listed Securities, and companies with substantial turnover traded on the other markets, therefore the sample covers relatively high share of turnover and market capitalization of the BSSE despite the small size.
III. 2. International comparison of the extent of leverage
This study uses data based on the different accounting standards and hence the comparison of the results obtained for other countries can be inaccurate. Each country, in fact, has its own specific accounting practices, which cause difficulty in comparison (for example Rajan and Zingales, 1995, use Global Vantage database for G7 countries and still they experience differences in accounting practices). Therefore any comparison undertaken ought to keep this shortage in mind. In the empirical analysis, it is controlled for the country-specific effects, which includes also the differences in accounting standards. Table 3 reports the average balance sheet for years 2000 and 2001. Only items used in later analysis are described. Poland is treated as a reference group, because the share of Polish companies in the sample is the highest from all four Visegrad countries and therefore this reference group should be the stablest of all possible choices. First, the respective item for each firm was scaled by total assets and then averaged across all firms in the relevant subsample. Subsequently it was multiplied by 100, thus, the reported values are in % of total assets. In the column under the year, average value across all observations is noted. In the column under Pl, which denotes Poland as a reference group, the respective share is expressed. DC stands for the difference for the Czech Republic, DH for the difference for Hungary, DS for the difference for the Slovak Republic. *,**,*** refer to the statistically significant difference at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. For example, in the case of the year 2000, average value of tangible assets in the whole sample is 42% of total assets. In the case of Poland, this share is 37%. In the case of the Czech Republic, it is 37%+17%=54%, the difference between Poland and the Czech Republic is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Several interesting observations can be made from the average balance sheet as reported in Table 3 . Above all, statistically significant differences in the majority of items within the group of Visegrad countries can be seen. Visegrad countries can be also compared with G7 countries 11 . On the assets side of the balance sheet, the proportion of tangible assets in Visegrad countries is relatively high, higher than in the case of six from the group of G7
countries. Only Canada exhibits higher value. On the side of liabilities, companies in Visegrad countries show higher proportion of equity than companies in G7 countries. They also use lower share of long-term liabilities than companies in most of G7 countries and the dominant role in total liabilities is represented by short-term liabilities.
Here, the problem arises how to measure the leverage of a company. As Rajan and Zingales (1995, p. 1427) state: "Clearly, the extent of leverage -and the most relevant measure -depends on the objective of the analysis." The discussion concerning the different measures of leverage can be found in Rajan and Zingales (1995 , pp. 1427 -1433 .
In this study, the basic definition of leverage, i.e., the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 12 is used in order to analyse determinants of capital structure. Leverage is used expressed in book value as well as in market value (thus two measures of leverage are used in this study; they are summarized in Table 4 ). Table 5 compares the extent of leverage as defined in Table 4 within Visegrad countries as well as between Visegrad countries and selected developed and developing countries. Booth et al. (2001) As reported in Table 5 , TL in the Czech Republic and Hungary is lower than in Poland and the Slovak Republic. Visegrad countries exhibit lower value of TL than G7 countries and they demonstrate median value if compared to developing countries. In general, developing countries seem to have lower value of TL than G7 countries, so the firms in developing countries have higher share of equity in total assets. Different results are obtained when leverage is measured in market value. Because of low P/B ratio in Visegrad countries (for more details, see below), the value of MTL is higher than in non-continental-European G7 countries. Continental-European G7 countries exhibit equal or higher values of MTL. China presents a very special case, the reason is given below where P/B ratios are discussed.
Unfortunately, values for other developing countries are not available.
III. 3. Determinants of Capital Structure
As is stated in Chapter II, six possible determinants of leverage are analysed in this study.
They are summarized in Table 6 . First column indicates the abbreviation as used in this paper, second one labels the name and the third one represents the definition. Table 5 . PB in the case of China means Tobin´s Q (defined as market-to-book ratio of total assets); the corresponding value of P/B ratio is 5.24 (calculated from Huang and Song, 2002) . TANG in the case of Booth et al. (2001) is defined as total assets less current assets divided by total assets. Values for G7 countries were obtained as follows -TANG and PB were calculated from Rajan and Zingales (1995) ; VOLTY, ROA and ln TA from Wald (1999) , where the same time period as in Rajan and Zingales (1995) is used. NDTS for USA are from Kim and Sorensen (1986) , however, the values are from the period 1975-1980. As Table 7 informs, in general, the firm SIZE is higher in G7 countries than in developing countries including Visegrad countries. Concerning Visegrad countries, listed firms are bigger in the Czech Republic and Hungary than in Poland. In the case of the Slovak Republic, the SIZE is biased by the small sample size, which includes primarily big companies. Within G7 countries, values of firm size are very similar. Conversely, the size of listed firms in developing countries is very different among countries.
The value of ROA in Visegrad countries is lower than in G7 countries and much lower than in developing countries. The highest profitability within Visegrad countries exhibit firms in the Czech Republic and Hungary.
Tangibility in Visegrad countries is higher than in G7 countries except Canada. In general, tangibility is higher in the case of developing countries than in the case of developed countries. From Visegrad countries, the highest value of tangibility shows the Czech Republic.
In Visegrad countries, the P/B ratio is lower than one, as well as in three other developing countries (South Korea, Pakistan and Zimbabwe). The lowest value of PB exhibit the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic, contrariwise Hungary and Poland show the P/B ratio above one. Within G7 countries, the lowest P/B ratio is exhibited by Italy (exactly one).
In all other countries the value of the P/B ratio is above one. China is a very special case, the average value of the P/B ratio is over five; therefore leverage expressed in market value is much lower than leverage assessed in book value.
The value of NDTS is not available, except for Visegrad countries, the USA and China. The sensible comparison is, therefore, not possible. However, the value of NDTS is the highest in the case of the USA and the lowest in the case of China. Within Visegrad countries, the values of NDTS are very similar.
The value of VOLTY is higher in developing countries than in G7 countries. Within Visegrad countries, the highest value of VOLTY is recorded for Poland and the lowest for the Slovak Republic.
Empirical analysis of capital structure's determinants in Visegrad countries follows.
Because dependent variable is restricted to the unit interval (0,1) 13 , the linear model for E(y|x)
cannot be a good description of the effects of respective regressors on the dependent variable.
Primarily because of the fact that for estimated coefficients there would be feasible values of explanatory variables such that predicted dependent variable is outside the unit interval. As Papke and Wooldridge (1996, p. 620) state: "Thus, the drawbacks of linear models for
fractional data are analogous to the drawbacks of the linear probability model for binary data." As they add: "The most common alternative […] has been to model the log-odds ratio as a linear function. If y is strictly between zero and one then a linear model for the log-odds
[This] is attractive because log[y/(1-y)] can take on any real value as y varies between 0 and 1, so it is natural to model its population regression as a linear function." However, there are two potential drawbacks of this approach. First, when y takes on values 0 or 1, an adjustment has to be made before computing the log-odds ratio. This does not cause any problem in our case, because y is strictly between zero and one. The second drawback is more important -without further assumptions, E(y|x) cannot be recovered 14 . To avoid this problem, E(y|x) can be modeled as a logistic function:
This approach leads to predicted values of y within an unit interval (0,1). The interpretation of estimated results is very similar as in the case of logit model for binary data.
How to estimate β in such a model? As Wooldridge (2002, p. 662) proposes: "One approach to estimate β is nonlinear least squares." However, as he admits (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 662) : "The assumption that implies relative efficiency of NLS-namely, Var (y|x) = σ 2 -is unlikely to hold for fractional y." Therefore Papke and Wooldridge (1996) propose to estimate β by quasi-maximum likelihood estimation, where the quasi-log likelihood for observation i is:
In our case, when E(y|x) is modeled as a logistic function, G is defined as:
In Table 8 , the estimations of β using quasi-MLE are reported. Fully robust standard errors are reported in parentheses 15 . The sign of β reveals the sign of relationship between dependent variable and respective regressor as well as the statistical significance shows the statistical significance of the relationship. However, because the relationship between regressors and dependent variable is non-linear, the size of the effects cannot be seen from Table 8 directly. However, the marginal effects and elasticities can be defined as follows:
In Table 9 , two marginal effects are reported. The definitions of reported marginal effects and elasticity are as following: ; statistical significance is linked to the estimation results as reported in Table 8 .
Theoretical prediction of the relationship between size and leverage is ambiguous.
Empirical studies experience mainly positive relationship. This is also the result of our study. SIZE is statistically significant at the 1% level in all four models, the sign is always positive.
Thus the theory that size is an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy is supported by the results.
There is no consistent theoretical prediction of the influence of profitability on leverage. However, in the majority of empirical studies, a negative relationship between profitability and leverage is observed. This study provides the same result. ROA is statistically significant in all four models, the sign is always negative. This result confirms the pecking-order theory rather than static trade-off models.
From the theoretical point of view, a positive relationship is expected between leverage and tangibility. However, based on the results of this study, the relationship is negative. This is also the result of empirical studies for other developing countries, whereas developed countries exhibit positive relationship. This can be partly explained by the institutional environment, which causes difficulties and lowers the value of the assets in the case of firm bankruptcy in developing countries, compared to developed countries. However, such effect could explain no relationship, but it is not very likely to cause the negative relationship, which is observed in analysis. Therefore some additional explanation should be offered by the theory. The relationship between tangibility and leverage is negative in all four models, albeit it is statistically significant in only two models.
Theoretically, the expected relation between growth opportunities and leverage is negative. The results of this study confirm this expectation, as do other empirical studies for developed countries. However, PB is statistically significant only in cases when leverage is expressed in market value. When leverage is measured in book value, rather positive relation is detected, as is also the case of empirical studies for developing countries. However, statistical significance of the relationship in this case is lower than in the previous case.
For non-debt tax shields, the results confirm theoretical prediction, i.e., negative relationship to leverage. NDTS is statistically significant in three models, the sign is always negative.
Theoretical prediction of the relationship between volatility and leverage is not clear. This study does not provide us with a clear empirical result, because of relatively low statistical significance of VOLTY. However, the relation between volatility and leverage is always negative. This result supports a view of volatility as a proxy for the risk of a firm.
Concerning dummy variables, they are used in order to control for the fixed-effects of respective country (especially for the differences in accounting standards).
According to the values of adjusted coefficient of determination (Adj R 2 ), explanatory power of models is higher when the leverage is expressed in market value than when it is assessed in book value. Explanatory power of models presented in this study is, in general, relatively high in comparison to studies of similar character.
For greater clarity, results are summarized in Table 10 . 
IV. Conclusions
In this paper, capital structure of listed companies in Visegrad countries is analysed.
In general, listed firms in Visegrad countries exhibit lower leverage than listed firms in G7 countries and median value of leverage among developing countries 16 , when measured by Book Total Liabilities Ratio. Different results are obtained when leverage is expressed in market value. Because of relatively low P/B ratio, leverage in Visegrad countries is higher than in non-continental-European G7 countries, whereas Continental-European G7 countries exhibit equal or higher values of leverage. Thus, firms in Visegrad countries show relatively low leverage measured in book value, but relatively high leverage assessed in market value.
Based on data availability, six potential determinants of capital structure are analysed in this paper -size, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields and volatility. According to the results of empirical analysis, leverage of listed firms in Visegrad countries is positively correlated with size. This result supports the view of size as an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. Leverage is negatively correlated with profitability, this finding is consistent with the pecking-order hypothesis rather than with static trade-off models. Negative relationship between tangibility and leverage is in contradiction with theoretical prediction. Similar result experience also empirical studies for other developing countries, whereas developed countries exhibit positive relation. This can be partly explained by the institutional environment, which causes difficulties and lowers the value of the assets in the case of firm bankruptcy in developing countries, compared to developed countries.
However, such effect could explain no relationship, but it is not very likely to cause the negative relationship, which is observed in the analysis. Therefore some additional explanation should be offered by the theory. The relationship between leverage and the P/B ratio (proxy for growth opportunities) is negative, given that the leverage is measured in market value. This result confirms theoretical prediction that firms with higher future growth opportunities use more equity financing. Negative relationship between leverage and non-debt 16 ´Developing countries´ comprise eleven in-this-study-reported developing countries.
tax shields is in accordance with theoretical prediction and shows non-debt tax shields as substitutes to debt related tax shield. It can be stated, on the lower level of statistical significance, that leverage is negatively correlated with volatility. This result supports a view of volatility as a proxy for the risk of a firm.
As far as size, profitability and non-debt tax shields are concerned, the results are similar to the conclusions of the most of other empirical papers. In the case of tangibility, the findings of this study correspond to the results obtained for developing countries whereas in the case of growth opportunities the findings are in accordance with the results obtained for developed countries. Results and comparisons are not clear in the case of volatility.
In general, leverage of listed firms in Visegrad countries seems to be determined by the same factors as leverage of listed firms in G7 countries and in developing countries reported in this paper. The explanatory power of models used in this study is relatively high.
Finally, several comments should be made with regard to possible limitations and prospective extensions of this study.
First, as data used in this study is based on different accounting standards, comparison within Visegrad countries as well as with other countries is not always appropriate. However, in empirical analysis, we control for the country-specific fixed effects, which includes also differences in accounting practices.
Second, the results for the Slovak Republic are very limited to interpret, because of substantial bias. This bias is caused by the small size of the sample compared to the number of listed companies. However, the sample covers relatively high share of turnover and market capitalization of the BSSE despite the small size.
